Introduction 1
This paper proposes an explanation for the complementation patterns of verbs, nouns and adjectives in languages like English. We focus on those properties often taken to follow from the theory of case, and add to the picture new observations about the distribution of clausal complements.
Our results build on the proposals of Pesetsky and Torrego (2001, henceforth "P&T 2001") .
In that paper we argued that several distinct syntactic phenomena result from interactions between tense-motivated movement into the C-system and nominative case on the subject. This work attempted to unite a number of strands of research that had generally been pursued separately. In particular, our results suggested that work on the syntax of tense illuminates the theory of case. The distribution of tense inside arguments turned out to interact strongly with the external distribution of these arguments. The present paper suggests a broader unification of these research strands with recent work on the nature of syntactic categories. This paper is organized as follows. We begin by summarizing the results of P&T 2001.
Next, we extend these results, offering a general theory of complementation patterns. This theory, in turn, will reveal a previously hidden complementarity in the distribution of arguments.
Finally, we suggest that this "hidden complementarity" provides support for approaches that view the distinctions among lexical categories as contextually determined.
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types. Our proposal supported the following hypothesis concerning the nature of nominative case: 2
(1) The nature of nominative case Nominative case is an instance of an uninterpretable Tense feature (uT) on D.
The hypothesis in (1) entails that the relationship between a nominative subject and T is symmetrical. Subject agreement on T reflects a set of ϕ-features on T (uϕ) which have no semantic interpretation as part of TP, but would receive an interpretation if they were part of a nominal. Hypothesis (1) amounts to the claim that nominative case on a subject reflects Tfeatures on D which have no semantic interpretation as part of DP but would receive an interpretation if they were part of T. We sketch the arguments for this approach in the next section.
Hypothesis ( Most features seem to belong to categories A and B. Structural case is a salient exception: a seeming instance of category C. Hypothesis (1) amounts to the claim that nominative case, at least, is actually an instance of category B, and immediately suggests the more general hypothesis that category C does not exist at all -i.e. that all grammatical features have some potential semantic value. If this is so, then we must adopt a view like (1) not only for nominative, but also for other instances of structural case as well. In this paper, we argue that not only nominative, but all instances of structural case are actually instances of uT on D. This proposal suggests an analysis of clause structure that offers a new perspective on the overlapping 2. This hypothesis was first suggested by Williams (1994, 11 ) (a fact regrettably missed by P&T 2001), and was explored independently by Haeberli (1999) .
-3-yet diverse complementation properties of the categories V, N and A. As a result many of the phenomena discussed under the rubric of "Case Theory" (along with others not normally consider case-related) can receive a unified explanation in a framework without type C features -a framework in which the notion "structural case feature" is not an independent concept.
In particular, we will argue for a proposal about accusative case that parallels (1):
The nature of accusative case Accusative case (like nominative) is an instance of uT on D.
If hypothesis (2) is correct, we must ask what category enters an Agree relation with "accusative"
uT and allows it to delete (as is required of uninterpretable features). We will argue that uT on a complement of V enters an Agree relation with an instance of T that is structurally lower than the main tense of the sentence. Contrasts in the complementation properties of V, N and A will turn out to stem from differences in the presence and nature of this lower T. That conclusion will lead us to a proposal with which we will conclude this paper: that apparent distinctions among V, N and A actually reflect distinctions in this lower T -a proposal with potentially far-reaching consequences for the theory of syntactic categorization.
Nominative case
In this section, we offer a brief review of the results of P&T 2001 that support hypothesis
(1). 3 In that paper, we sought an account of the paradigm in (3). When wh-movement takes place in a matrix clause of Standard English, and the wh-phrase is not a nominative subject, T-to-C movement is also observed, as in the interrogative (3b). T-to-C movement may also fail to apply, as in (3a). (Failure of T-to-C movement yields an exclamative, rather than interrogative interpretation, a fact discussed by P&T 2001 which we will ignore here. 4 ) Crucially, when a nominative wh-phrase undergoes local wh-movement, T-to-C movement is never observed, as seen in (3c-d):
(3) T-to-C asymmetry in matrix questions (Koopman 1983) [non-subject wh → "optional" T-to-C] a. What a nice book Mary read __! b. What did Mary read __?
[subject wh → no T-to-C] c. Who __ read the book? d.*Who did __ read the book?/*What a nice person did read the book! Our approach relied on the resources of the theory of movement developed by Chomsky (1995 Chomsky ( , 2000 Chomsky ( , 2001 according to which the first ingredient of movement is an Agree relation established between an unintepretable feature uF of a probe category H and a corresponding feature of a goal category G. The second ingredient is movement itself, triggered by an EPP subfeature of uF on H. 5 In (3b), we argued that T-to-C movement is a response to an Agree relation established between uT on C and TP. (P&T 2001 proposed that when a head H bears the feature [uF, +EPP] , and when this feature probes a goal GP that is the complement of H, it is head movement of G to H that satisfies EPP -a generalization of the Head Movement Constraint of Travis 1984 .) If C bears [uT, +EPP] , then (3a) and (3c) are surprising, since no T-to-C movement is observed in these examples. It was to explain these cases that we first offered the hypothesis in (1). If nominative case is actually a T-feature, then in principle a nominative subject can serve as a goal for uT on C just as well as TP itself can. Since neither the nominative subject or TP c-commands the other, both thus count as bearers of T-features that are equally close to C. We thus proposed that Mary in (3a) is an inner specifier of CP, moved there in response to [uT, +EPP] on C, just as T itself is moved in (3b).
In all the examples of (3), C bears not only [uT +EPP], but also [uWh +EPP]. Because in (3a-b), the closest bearer of wh within the clause is not also the closest bearer of uT, we observe two instances of movement triggered by C: T-movement triggered by [uT +EPP] on C, and wh-movement triggered by [uWh +EPP] . In (3c), the nominative subject of the clause is also a wh-phrase. Thus, the closest bearer of uT is also the closest bearer of wh. It is thus not surprising that only one instance of movement is observed. The nominative wh-phrase can 5. The idea that EPP is a subfeature of an uninterpretable feature departs slightly from the proposals offered by Chomsky in the works cited.
-5-serve as a goal for both [uT +EPP] and [uWh +EPP] on C, and one instance of movement can satisfy the EPP subproperties of both features on C.
What accounts for the unacceptability of (3d)? This example is identical to (3c) -a situation in which a single instance of movement can satisfy two properties of C -except that these two properties are here satisfied by two distinct instances of movement: T-to-C movement satisfying uT on C, and wh-movement satisfying uWh. To account for the unacceptability of (3d), P&T 2001 proposed that unnecessary movement operations (e.g. T-to-C movement in (3d)) are forbidden by the general Economy condition in (4):
Economy of movement The EPP properties of uF on a head H are satisfied by the smallest possible number of movement operations.
The paradigm seen in the interrogatives and exclamatives of (3) of Koopman 1983 ) that the resemblance is not accidental.
In particular, P&T 2001 made the proposal in (7):
(7) Nature of English that That is not C, but a particular realization of T moved to C.
English C itself, according to this proposal, is phonologically null. On this view, the that-trace effect in (6d) does not merely resemble the "did-trace" effect in (3d) and (5d); it is, in fact, the same effect. 6 The that-trace/did-trace effect thus provided one argument for the hypothesis about nominative case in (1).
The idea about that in (7) offers an immediate analysis of the more general omissability of that in English. The [uT, +EPP] feature of C can in principle, as we have seen, trigger either Tto-C movement, or subject movement to Spec,CP. The that-trace effect and related phenomena arise when both C and the subject bear a wh-feature. The Economy condition in (4) thus favors subject movement over T-to-C movement, as just discussed. When the subject (or C) does not bear a wh-feature, both types of movement are equally costly; therefore, both types of movement are possible. That is why (3a) and (3b) are both possible, and also why (8a) and (8b) (which involve no wh-movement whatsoever) are both possible:
6. Radford (2000) offers a modification of P&T 2001's proposals in which it is not T itself that moves to C and is pronounced as that, but a distinct "finiteness" head between T and C. This eliminates the need to identify the phonology relation between that and the tensed verb as a form of "doubling" (as in P&T 2001), but at the cost of requiring distinct explanations for the that-trace effect and the "did-trace effect" -since a different category moves in the two constructions.
-7- (8) The apparent optionality of that in C of an embedded declarative thus reflects the choice between T-to-C movement (that) and subject movement to Spec,CP (no that) as ways of satisfying the [uT, +EPP] property of C. 7 On this view, the well-known observation that that is not omissible in subject CPs (Chomsky and Lasnik 1977; Stowell 1981; Kayne 1980) amounts to the claim that only CPs in which T has moved to C are acceptable as subjects of a higher clause: The paradigm in (9) can be immediately understood once we remember that instances of uninterpretable T are deleted at some point after they enter an Agree relation with a distinct instance of T. If this deletion operation must apply in an embedded CP before that CP moves to form a subject of a higher clause, as in (9c-d), only a CP introduced by the word that -an instance of interpretable (non-deletable) T moved to C -will continue to have an instance of T in C after deletion applies. In P&T 2001, we suggested that T of the higher clause accepts as its subject specifier only a category that itself has an instance of T in its head. We identified this as a consequence of a general "Match Condition" on EPP satisfaction, but for present purposes, we can simply view this as the familiar requirement that the subject of a finite clause in English must be nominative, i.e. must have a T-feature on its head. This idea rests on a natural generalization of our hypotheses in (1) and (2) that would identify as case-marked not only a 7. We continue to leave open, as in P&T, the nature of the mechanism that decides -apparently on a languageparticular and dialect-particular basis -when T in C is spelled out as that doubling an inflected main or auxiliary verb and when it is spelled out as a displaced auxiliary verb.
category with uT in its head, but also a category with iT in its head. Thus, after instances of uT in C that have entered an Agree relation have been deleted, finite clauses introduced by thatbut not finite clauses without that -count as "nominative". The that-omission asymmetry thus provides a second argument in favor of the identification of nominative case with T.
Non-finite clauses in English have an obvious counterpart to that when the subject of the clause is overt. This is the clause-introducing element for (in Standard English), which we also identify as an instance of T moved to C. Evidence for this analysis includes the existence of "for-trace effects" and a "for-omission asymmetry" parallel to the that-omission asymmetry seen in (9) Finally, as noted by P&T 2001, a counterpart to the for-omission asymmetry can be detected with non-finite clauses whose subject is PRO. Bresnan (1972) , Carstairs (1973) , Pesetsky (1989) and others have observed that infinitives introduced by for have a characteristic semantics: most often irrealis, but also generic. Stowell (1982) and Pesetsky (1989) added to this the discovery that this type of semantics also characterizes infinitives with PRO when these infinitives occur as subjects of a higher clause. Thus, while complement infinitives with PRO may be realis (factive or implicative) or irrealis/generic, depending on semantic properties of the higher clause, subject infinitives are limited to irrealis/generic semantics: We suggest that this is simply the for-omission asymmetry of (11) in disguise. It appears to be a fact about Standard English that T moved to C of an infinitival clause is spelled out as a null morpheme when T agrees with PRO, and is spelled out as for otherwise. We thus detect T moved to C in an infinitive with PRO by inspecting its semantics, rather than its phonological form, since an infinitive in which T moved to C is a null morpheme will be homophonous with an infinitive in which PRO has moved to Spec,CP and T has not moved at all. These observations will be quite important in section 6.
Accusative case
The explanation offered by P&T 2001 for the phenomena discussed in the previous section, if correct, provides support for the hypothesis that structural case features are actually T features.
Our discussion so far has established this for nominative case. In this section, we begin our presentation of new material, and take up the question of accusative case.
If structural case in general is T, then the "Case Filter" of Government-Binding Theory (Chomsky 1981) can be understood as the Argument-Tense Condition in (13). We will discuss the rationale for (13) below. For now, we will assume that it is true, and discuss some of its consequences.
In English, at least, instances of D and C come from the lexicon bearing uT, not iT. Because CP contains TP, uT on C has the ability to satisfy its requirements internal to its maximal projection, as discussed in the preceding section. CPs are thus self-sufficient with respect to uT.
English DP (with qualifications noted below) does not contain TP, and thus does not have a comparable ability to satisfy its requirements internally. In this sense, DPs are not selfsufficient. DP, unlike CP, is dependent on the external environment to satisfy its uT property.
This is the traditional observation that DPs must search for case, unlike CPs.
Our discussion will take the following form. Consider the hypothesis in (2) -that our conclusions about nominative case extend to accusative. When we combine this hypothesis with the observation that DPs are not self-sufficient with respect to uT, we conclude that there must be some occurrence of T in a transitive clause that is responsible for licensing accusative case. We will show that once we have understood the properties of this occurrence of T correctly, we have acquired an understanding of the overall distribution of complements across categories. This result in turn provides support for our initial hypothesis.
We argue first that the most conservative proposal along these lines -a proposal suggested by P&T 2001 (pp. 366-367) -is not correct (at least for languages like English). This proposal would identify the T responsible for accusative case with the T responsible for nominative case -i.e. the main Tense of the sentence.
Consider the complementation properties of clauses whose main predicate is an AP. As is well-known, a DP in English may not serve as the complement to A, but a CP may:
(14) DP complement to A: impossible *Bill was afraid the storm.
-11-(15) CP complement to A: possible 8 a. Bill was afraid that the storm will be destructive. b. Bill was afraid the storm will be destructive. c. John was eager to read the instructions. d. John was careful to read the instructions.
We observe that the complement position in AP may be occupied by a self-sufficient argument, but not by an argument that is not self-sufficient. This makes sense, if clauses whose main predicate is AP contain no category capable of deleting uT on a complement DP. Crucially, however, the main clauses of (14) and (15) do contain an occurrence of T that deletes uT on a nominative subject. Clearly, this instance of T does not also delete uT on an accusative object. This is true either because this instance of T can Agree only with one DP, or because it is structurally too far away from the complement of A.
All things being equal, we expect T in a clause whose predicate is verbal to have fundamentally the same properties as the corresponding T in a clause whose predicate is adjectival. This means that we must attribute the availability of accusative case for objects of V (and its unavailability for objects of A) to some factor other than the main T of the sentence. We suggest that verbal predication structures differ from their adjectival counterparts in the presence of a second occurrence of T -closer to the complement of V than the main occurrence of T, and close enough to enter an agree relation with uT on a DP complement. We will use the label T o for this lower occurrence of T, and T s for the main T of the sentence.
T o , like T s , bears uninterpretable φ-features which act as a probe seeking a goal in its domain -a goal that also bears φ-features. Except for possible differences in EPP properties, the subscripts "o" and "s" may be regarded for present purposes as nothing more than a notation for keeping track of which T is under discussion. We will refine this proposal as we proceed, and leave open the possibility of other (perhaps semantic) differences between the two occurrences of T.
8. Note that all types of CPs -finite CPs with and without that, and non-finite CPs that are realis or irrealis/generic -are acceptable as complements of A. This fact will be important later.
In many instances, the semantic function of T o is apparent. A particularly clear example is provided by telic verbs (e.g. read) whose meaning involves two distinct subevents. The first subevent is a process (a predicate with an agent argument, in the case of read). The second subevent is the completion of the process (a predicate with an additional argument, i.e. the thing read). Following Hale and Keyser (1993) and Chomsky (1995, ch. 4) , we propose that the predicate of each subevent is a distinct level item. In the case of a verbal predicate like read, the predicate that assigns the agent role can be called (for convenience) v; and the lower predicate, V.
Tense heads quite generally have the property of ordering pairs of times, as argued by Klein (1994) , Zagona (1990) , Stowell (1995) The structure in (16) strongly resembles proposals advanced in much recent work. Kratzer (1996) and Travis (1992) suggested the existence of an aspectual head located in the position of our T o . Torrego (1999 Torrego ( /2002 proposed the same structure, and argued further that this aspectual head belongs to the category P, an idea that will become important shortly. Lasnik and Saito (1991) , Koizumi (1993 Koizumi ( , 1995 and Lasnik (1999) A similar effect is observed with conocer, which may mean either 'know' (stative) or 'get to know' (non-stative). With an animate object, the two readings are disambiguated by a:
(18) a marks non-stativity: conocer a. Conoce bien un vecino suyo. 'They know a neighbor of theirs well.' b. Conoce bien a un vecino suyo. 'They got to know a neighbor of theirs well.' Not surprisingly, the imperative (which disambiguates in favor of non-stativity) is unacceptable with an animate object unless the object is preceded by a:
[continued from previous page] important question of whether this is a general property of (English) T o or a variable property triggered, perhaps, by other factors. See Platzack (2001) for discussion of related matters.
11. As is well-known, other factors play a role in distribution of a, including (in some cases) specificity, which we will not deal with here.
(19) ¡Conoce *(a) tu vecino! 'Get to know your neighbor.' (Torrego 1998, 32) [vs. ¡Conoce la ciudad 'Get to know the city.'] The phenomenon is quite general. An achievement predicate, even one without a stative alternant, takes a DP complement with a when the complement is animate:
(20) Spanish a with achievement predicates a. La policía detuvo *(a) un ladrón. the police detained (to) a thief 'The police detained a thief.'
b. La lluvia empapó *(a) muchos turistas. The rain soaked (to) many tourists 'The rain soaked many tourists.' (Torrego 1998, 30) Similar correlations between aspect and the form of objective case have been observed in other languages, e.g. by Kiparsky (1998) for the accusative/partitive alternation in Finnish and by Svenonius (2001) for a dative/accusative alternation in Icelandic. It is our hope that correlations of this sort can be related to a general theory of instantiations of T o .
Adjectival clauses differ crucially from verbal clauses. The structure we suggest for adjectival clauses is (21). We have included a distinction between a and A, modeled on the distinction between v and V, but nothing in this paper hinges on this. What is crucial is the absence of T o :
In addition to modeling the distinction in complementation possibilities between verbal and adjectival clauses, the structures in (16) and (21) predict that adjectives denoting temporally distinct subevents should not exist. This prediction appears to be correct. Adjectival clauses may be individual-level (e.g. altruistic) or stage-level (drunk), may denote a process (busy) or the result of a process (destroyed) -but there appear to be no adjectives that denote two-part events with different times associated with the two parts. Thus, for instance, it is impossible to say #The woman very angry in three minutes was Mary, where very makes it clear that angry is an adjective, and in three minutes diagnoses telicity, i.e. a process followed by an end-state. The -15-intended meaning would be something like 'The woman who moved from a state of non-anger to a state of extreme anger in three minutes was Mary', yet adjectival constructions with this sort of meaning do not exist. We attribute this to the inability of adjectives to distinguish the times of two subevents, a consequence of the absence of T o .
Prepositional Phrases
Adjectives in languages like English may, of course, take PPs as complements:
(22) PP complement to A Bill was afraid of the storm.
If the Argument Tense Condition in (13) (21) is correct, a PP complement to A must be "self-sufficient", just as CP is. In fact, there is evidence that the category P is actually a kind of T. This T occupies a position within certain DPs that is quite analogous to the position occupied by T within CP. Thus PP is not just self-sufficient, but is actually a special self-sufficient type of DP. One argument for this view comes from a surprising "P-trace" effect discovered by Kayne (1984, p. 28) .
When an English gerund is the object of V, either the subject or object of the gerund may be extracted by A-bar movement, as seen in the (a) and (b) examples of (23)- (25) below. When the same gerund is the object of a preposition, however, subject extraction is noticeably worse than object extraction. Speakers' judgments concerning the strength of the effect vary somewhat, but the contrast is clear to most speakers: Kayne conjectured that this effect has the same source as the that-trace effect. If this is so, then our analysis of the that-trace effect can extend to the P-trace effect. Crucially, we must assume that the prepositions in the (c) and (d) examples of (23)- (25) are instances of T within the gerund. These instances of T may serve as goals for uT on C/D of the gerund 12 , as shown in (26):
(26) P as T within a gerund
As in non-gerunds, when C/D also bears uWh and the subject is a nominative wh-phrase, it will be more economical for the [uT, +EPP] feature of C/D to be satisfied by Agree and by movement of the subject, than by distinct operations involving both the subject and the head of TP. In other clause-types, the result would be an acceptable output in which T fails to raise to C/D (perhaps remaining unpronounced, like unraised that), e.g. outputs like those in (27). In these examples, however, failure of the preposition (i.e. T) to move to C leads to a configuration in which the selectional properties of the higher verb are not satisfied. The verbs 12. See P&T 2001 for arguments inspired by Szabolcsi (1983; 1987) that D and C are the same category. If this view is correct, D is simply the name traditionally used when the category takes a nominal complement, while C is simply the name used with a clausal complement. Reflecting ambiguities familiar from the literature, we use the mixed term C/D for the category when it introduces a gerund, but nothing hinges on this label. The similarity between a gerund introduced by a preposition and the CPs that we have discussed so far makes it clear why these types of gerunds, at least, may occur as complements to A:
(28) P-introduced gerund as complement of A Anne is afraid [of Mary winning the prize].
The uT feature on C/D of the gerund enters an Agree relation with the preposition (an instance of T), and thus does not need an external T o to satisfy its requirements.
We turn now to an obvious objection to this analysis: the derived constituent structure of PPs.
If the derived structure for PPs were identical to the derived structure of that-clauses and forclauses, they would show a bimorphemic head consisting of C/D and the moved preposition.
The sister of this bimorphemic head would be the gerundive TP. Such an analysis would fly in the face of the fact that movement of the gerund may strand the preposition -an option not available to finite and infinitival TP complements of C: This is an important issue that we do not have space to discuss fully in this paper. We will, however, briefly sketch an answer to this question, inspired by ideas of Matushansky (2002), and will address the topic in greater detail in a fuller presentation of this material.
13. The logic of the situation is predicted by a bottom-to-top derivation of the sort assumed in this work: the Economy Condition applies within the gerund clause blindly, and is not outranked by the subcategorization requirements of a predicate merged later.
Both T-to-C movement in finite and non-finite clauses and the prepositional version of T-to-C movement in gerunds are instances of head movement. T-to-C movement in finite clauses and infinitives yields a structure familiar from work on head movement by Travis (1984) and Baker (1988) , in which the moved head morphologically adjoins to the head whose features trigger the movement. Our results as a whole argue strongly that head movement belongs to the same system as phrasal movement. This leads one naturally to wonder why the derived constituent structure after head movement should involve morphological adjunction, rather than specifier formation, as is the case with phrasal movement. Matushansky suggests that head movement does in fact form a specifier, just like phrasal movement (in agreement with Fukui and Takano (1998, 44-51) ; see also Toyoshima 2001) . Matushansky proposes in addition that the familiar morphologically adjoined structure is the result of a second, "follow-up" process, triggered by some heads but not by others, that "morphologically merges" a non-branching Spec,H with H itself. The two processes, Head Movement and Morphological Merger, are sketched in (30) If it is a fact that bare TPs do not undergo movement such as topicalization, the constituency indicated by the facts in (29) teaches us that head movement of a prepositional T to C/D of a gerund is not followed by morphological merger of the moved preposition with C/D. By contrast, head movement of T to C of a finite clause or infinitive is followed by morphological merger of T with C. If the topicalized constituent in (29a) is a maximal projection, then one further option besides the option of morphological merger must be allowed: it must be the case in -19-(29a) that the moved element (the preposition) projects, forming a TP (= PP) rather than a CP/DP. This is illustrated in (31) Much the same analysis can now be posited for non-gerund DPs introduced by a preposition.
Here too, we would argue that the preposition is actually a species of T merged below D and above NP (actually above nP, as discussed below). Here too, for English at least, we propose that the preposition undergoes head movement triggered by uT on D, and that this head movement is not followed up by morphological merger. As before, the possibility of stranding the preposition under movement indicates the possibility of projecting the moved preposition, rather than the D whose features triggered movement: 15
14. When the CP/DP on the right side of (31) undergoes movement, stranding the preposition, it is an instance of "remnant movement", in that the moved CP/DP contains a trace of the stranded preposition.
15. If, as just suggested (and contra Kayne 1994), TPs do not undergo movement -or at least do not undergo A-bar movement processes such as topicalization, the fact that the sequence P+DP may pied-pipe under topicalization must indicate that the projection of P, rather than D, after P-to-D movement, is optional. When piedpiping occurs, it is DP that has projected. If the choice of projecting category is made "once and for all" in a derivation, we understand why a P+DP sequence that has pied-piped to an intermediate position as part of a It is also a common observation that elements of the prepositional vocabulary are found in C.
This led Emonds (1985, chapter 7) to suggest that the category C be understood as a species of P.
Our treatment of English for, however, suggests that such elements are actually instances of T whose presence in C is due to movement -a hypothesis that might be plausibly extended to similar phenomena in other languages. 16 What common property unites members of the super-category that contains both prepositions and traditional instances of T? We suggest, though will not press the point, that this supercategory unites those predicates that situate events and individuals in time and space. It is a commonplace that the same vocabulary is often used for spatial and temporal location and direction (before, after, within, etc.), and for both spatial and temporal ordering. For prepositions that are not in any clear sense spatial or temporal, one can imagine a view of θ-role assignment that identifies such prepositions with positions in an abstract space in which a given state or scene takes place. The specific suggestion that prepositions and traditional instances of T may belong to the same category has been argued for in recent work by Torrego (1999 Torrego ( /2002 16. This rethinking of the notion "prepositional complementizer" removes, perhaps, some of the initial plausibility of proposals that prepositions originate as clause-introducers. In several recent papers, Kayne (2000, chapters 14-15; has pursued this approach, analyzing apparent clause-internal instances of P as complementizers which come to occupy a clause-internal position (and to take a nominal complement) as a result of a series of movement operations. One might imagine a reinterpretation of Kayne's approach to certain empirical problems in terms of prepositional T s and T o . It could turn out that certain apparent PPs are actually composed by movement of a remote DP to the specifier of a T. We do not take up this possibility here. We suspect that it is not the correct analysis of the constructions we have discussed here, but that it might be on the right track in other domains.
-21-and Uribe-Etxebarria (2000) (who provide a general framework in which spatial and temporal predicates receive a similar syntax).
Properties of verbal T o
We have offered a proposal concerning the complementation properties of V and A. We will shortly be turning our attention to N, whose complementation properties will turn out to be systematically and interestingly different. These differences will lead us to the proposal concerning the nature of syntactic categories with which we will end this paper. We begin by The statement in (35) raises two obvious questions. The first concerns VPs that appear to contain no DP complement whatsoever, and thus potentially no instance of uT. The second concerns VPs that appear to contain a selected PP complement, and thus call into question the requirement for verbal T o to probe uT. We will briefly discuss each of these questions before proceeding further.
We focus first on the VP of sentences like those in (36) that lack an overt DP complement: No problem arises if we assume that defective T o in structures like (37) has the property in (35) as well (and likewise for defective T s ).
The verbs in (36d-f) are probably unergative. This means that the surface subject is not an underlying complement to V. Nonetheless, following Hale and Keyser (1993) (see also The null DP may be taken to be an expression whose meaning is provided by the verb, and which -if it were phonologically expressed -would be the DP found in cognate object and light verb constructions such as those in (39) Some of the examples in (42a-f) may well have an analysis like that proposed for unergative verbs -as a comparison of (42a-b) with (36d-e) immediately suggests. If these examples contain a phonologically null DP complement, as we suggested in (38) for standard unergative constructions, then the PP in these examples is once again a second object. This removes the possible objection to (35). Alternatively, if it should turn out to be the case that some PPs are genuine first objects of verbs, we might propose that satisfaction of the selectional properties of a verb takes priority over satisfaction of (35), i.e. that a violation of (35) by a goal that bears iT for selectional reasons is permitted. 17,18
17. "Pseudopassive" constructions might provide relevant evidence. Perlmutter and Postal (1984, pp. 100-104) note that the passive construction may strand the P of a complement PP to an unergative verb. Examples (ia-b) are from Perlmutter and Postal: (i) a. The room was exercised in by Spider Man. b. This hall has been lectured in by three Nobel laureates. c. The mailman was barked at by the dogs. d. That view was argued against by Sue. e. The president has been spoken to.
This possibility is surprising if unergative verbs always take a null DP object, and if the PPs in examples like those in (i) are second objects. With only sporadic exceptions (The building was taken care of by the custodian), the object of PPs that function as clear second objects cannot be moved under passive:
(ii) *This village was supplied grain with.
While this contrast might be taken as an argument against the proposal that unergative verbs take a null DP complement, it is also conceivable that the null DP complement is optionally absent, and that pseudopassivization is
[continued]
-25-Let us therefore assume that (35) is a correct generalization and begin to investigate its consequences. In this paper, we have discussed four argument types in English:
1. "bare" DP;
CP not introduced by that or for;
3. CP introduced by that or for; and 4. PP.
We will now examine how each of these argument types fares when merged as a complement to V and probed by verbal T o with the property in (35). We will see that a technical question concerning the timing of feature deletion needs to be resolved in a particular manner if we are to account correctly for the interaction of both T o and T s with these four clause types. This demonstration will put us in a good position to understand the distinctions between verbal and nominal complementation in the next section.
[continued from previous page] possible only when the DP option is not taken. This might help us understand non-unaccusative verbs that do not allow pseudopassivization; these might be verbs that require the null DP complement:
a. *The government was worked for by many ethnic minorities. b. *The bus driver was shouted to by the stranded passengers.
(compare: ok The bus driver was shouted at.
..)
We would analyze the stranded preposition of a pseudopassive construction as an instance of prepositional T that is "defective" in the sense discussed above in the main text. It is because the preposition is defective in a pseudopassive that its DP complement must search elsewhere for a way to mark its uT feature (its Case) for deletion. If a defective preposition counts as an instance of iT, then pseudopassive constructions offer a clear case in which verbal T o tolerates a goal that does not bear uT, indicating that (35) must be understood as outranked by selectional requirements. We consider the question open.
18. The Spanish a linked to non-stative T o that introduces the animate DPs discussed in the previous section cannot be an instance of iT, but must be an instance of uT -i.e. a case marker (as argued by Torrego 1998) . If it originates inside DP, like other prepositions that we have discussed, then we must ask if it yields the same structure as English prepositions, i.e. if it ends up as a head of a PP. Torrego (1998) argues that this use of a does function as a head of a PP in one dialect of Spanish. If this is correct, then we must ask whether a contains any interpretable features whatsoever. It must, if Chomsky (1995, ch. 4 The most straightforward case is the first: a "bare" DP, i.e. a DP that does not contain a prepositional T. 19 (43) argument type 1: T o probing DP
The uφ features on T o probe the iφ features on DP. Since the head of DP contains uT, condition (35) is satisfied.
Consider next a finite CP complement to V that is not introduced by that (or for; the same analysis will extend to a realis infinitive functioning as the complement of V). (44) argument type 2: T o probing CP not introduced by that
Here the uφ features on T o probe the iφ features on CP. As long as uT on C is undeleted at the stage in the derivation at which uφ on T o acts as a probe, (35) is satisfied. This is an important 19. One might also investigate the possibility that bare DPs in English contain a "defective" T akin to the T of infinitival clauses from which raising takes place (Chomsky 2000) . On this view, in English, a phonologically null preposition raises to D in normal accusative DPs, but due to its defective nature (the absence of some potential
-27-point. In P&T 2001 the fact that uT on C deletes after entering an Agree relation with uT on a subject DP provided an explanation for the that-omission asymmetry in (9). We claimed that once an uninterpretable feature has been "marked for deletion" by entering an Agree relation, it deletes quite soon. In the case at hand, we claimed that uT on C deletes once its maximal projection (CP) has been fully formed. In essence, this amounted to the proposal that, as suggested by Chomsky (2000) , features marked for deletion disappear at the end of the next phase.
This proposal is incompatible with (35), and it is (35) that we will be defending at length shortly. In (44), the uT feature on C, marked for deletion by the nominative DP that moves to Spec,CP, must still be present at the point in the derivation at which uφ on T o probes the CP complement of V. On the other hand, if our account of the that-omission asymmetry is to be maintained, when such a CP is probed by a T that has an EPP property (T s in the case of the thatomission asymmetry), a uT feature on the head of that CP must delete before the CP moves to Spec,TP. That was the engine of our explanation for the that-omission asymmetry. Thus, the timing of deletion of uninterpretable features is important. One can imagine a number of different approaches to the issue. We will present the one that we consider the most straightforward.
Compare the structure in (44) to a structure in which exactly the same type of clause is an external argument of v that has not yet moved to Spec,TP s . Such a structure is given in (45), which ultimately yields an unacceptable output:
[continued from previous page] members of its φ-feature set) fails to mark uT on D for deletion. Spanish accusative a (Torrego 1998) may be an overt instance of a defective prepositional T of this sort.
(45) T s probing CP not introduced by that (argument type 2)
An uninterpretable feature marked for deletion, such as uT in (44) and (45), when present on a maximal projection α (CP), must be allowed to survive past the point at which other heads are merged and form their own maximal projections. Thus uT on C must still be present after the construction of VP and the merger of T o in (44), since T o (if (35) is true) still sees uT on CP.
The structure in (45) shows us that uT on C must also survive the completion of the phase boundary vP, since uφ on T s is capable of probing CP in this structure and, if (35) is true, still "sees" uT on CP. On the other hand, uT must delete once and for all in (45) before the EPP property of uT on T s is satisfied -since it is the deletion of uT on C in such structures that creates a violation of the requirement that subjects be "nominative" (the Match Condition of P&T 2001) and thus rules out finite subject CPs not introduced by that. We summarize this proposal in (46): (46) Timing of deletion of uninterpretable features An uninterpretable feature uF marked for deletion within a completed phase Π, is deleted the moment a new head σ is merged to Π.
We assume that the establishment of an Agree relation between the uninterpretable features of σ and any goals within phase Π is part of the process of merging σ with Π. The satisfaction of EPP properties of these features (the formation of specifiers of σ) involves one or more further instances of Merge, and thus is not simultaneous with the merger of σ and Π. Note also the crucial reference to "uF marked for deletion within a completed phase Π". The uT feature of the DP external argument in (43) enters an Agree relation and is marked for deletion by T s , but this relation is not established inside vP, therefore uT on DP does not delete before DP becomes the subject of T s .
-29-Let us now turn to the third argument type whose interaction with T o we will be discussing: a complement CP introduced by that (or for). In such a CP, T (iT) has moved to C, forming a specifier of CP that undergoes morphological merger with C (following the ideas of Note also that our proposals about timing also permit a CP introduced by that to function as the subject of a sentence, probed by T s . The uT feature of C is not yet deleted when the uφ features of T s probe a CP introduced by that in Spec,vP. This satisfies (35) for T s . As we just saw when considering argument type 2 as a sentential subject, uT on C will delete before CP moves to satisfy the EPP requirement of T s . A CP introduced by that, unlike a CP of argument type 2, still retains an instance of T in C after uT is deleted -namely, the instance of iT that moved to C and morphologically merged with it. Thus, a CP of type 3, unlike a CP of type 2, satisfies the Match Condition and can be a specifier of T s . clause (or for-clause), whose head does contain an instance of uT. More specifically, the head of a that-clause or for-clause contains both iT and uT, and it is the presence of uT that allows (35) to be satisfied.
Recall that the complementation patterns of verbs differ from the complementation patterns of adjectives. Adjectives are indifferent to the presence or absence of uT on the head of their complement. So long as the complement is self-sufficient, i.e. not in need of any T o whatsoever, the result will be acceptable. This fact entails the impossibility of a bare DP complement to A and the possibility of a PP complement to A. This pattern is the opposite of that observed with complements of V. On the other hand, adjectives and verbs are similar in both allowing a full array of CP complements, as seen in (15) We now turn to the complementation properties of nouns. At first sight, nouns appear to behave like adjectives. As is the case with adjectives, the complement of a noun may not be a bare DP, but may be a PP:
21. In an irrealis complement with a subject other than PRO, T in C is realized as for, as we expect: Bill was eager for Mary to read the instructions. properties of N and A to be complete. Thus, for instance, Chomsky (1980; , developing an unpublished suggestion by J.-R. Vergnaud, suggested that neither NP nor AP contains a structural case assigner for the complement. PP and CP, in turn, were taken to have no case need. Consequently, both PP and CP were predicted to be acceptable as complements of N and A -in contrast to DP. In later work, Chomsky (1986) suggested that N and A do assign case after all, but that this type of case is "inherent", and is "realized" as a preposition in languages like English. Crucially, neither of these variant proposals posited a case-theoretic difference between nominal and adjectival complementation structures. In our framework, such proposals could be translated straightforwardly into a hypothesis that N, like A, is not associated with T o .
We will argue, however, that this approach is wrong. The complementation properties of N and A, though similar with respect to DP and PP complements, are not identical. In particular, N and A behave quite differently with respect to CP complements.
As (50a-b) show, the presence of that is optional in finite CP complements to A. Finite CP complements to N, however, behave differently, as observed by Stowell (1981 Stowell ( , 1982 . Though judgments occasionally waver, the presence of that appears to be obligatory in a finite CP complement to N in English: 22 22. We assume that the CPs in examples like (53a-d) are normal complements to N, and seek an explanation in the properties of T o for the facts under discussion. Several previous researchers have suggested, however, that N does not take a normal finite CP complement at all, and use this claim as part of an explanation of the obligatoriness of that. Stowell (1981) , for example, argues that finite CPs that look like complements to N are actually appositive adjuncts. On this hypothesis, the CP in a nominal like Mary's belief that the world is round would be an appositive modifier that offers a description of Mary's belief. We have chosen nouns that exclude this analysis. The proof that X is not itself an instance of X, nor is a demonstration that X an instance of X. Thus, the CPs in (53a-d) cannot be appositive modifiers, contrary to Stowell's proposal (cf. also Ogawa 2001, 148-157) . Grimshaw (1990) offers a proposal similar to Stowell's in many respects, except that her analysis does not claim that all putative complements to N are actually appositives. According to Grimshaw's theory, the CPs in examples like (53a-d) are syntactic complements to N, and are interpreted relative to the "lexical-conceptual structure" (lcs)
[continued] Strikingly similar facts can be observed in the domain of infinitival complementation. Recall our discussion of the distribution of infinitives in section 2. In that section, we observed (following Stowell 1981; 1982) that an irrealis infinitival CP may function as the subject of a higher clause, just like a finite clause introduced by that. In contrast, a realis infinitival CP may
[continued from previous page] evoked by N much as they would be interpreted relative to the lcs of the corresponding V. They are not, however, θ-marked arguments of N, since Grimshaw argues that the θ-marking capacity of N is defective. N, according to Grimshaw, can only θ-mark an argument that is the object of a preposition. Grimshaw suggests (p. 80) that this claim may explain (in the context of a theory in which a null C must be governed by a θ-marker) the nonomissability of that. She argues at length that whatever the relation held by a CP complement to N, it is not θ-marking.
Grimshaw offers several pieces of evidence in support of this proposal. For example, she notes that adjectives like frequent and constant with a singular N eliminate result and object readings of N, and force arguments of N to be realized. This explains contrasts outside the domain of clausal complementation (e.g. the frequent expression of one's feelings vs. *the frequent expression, p. 50). Grimshaw states (p. 74) that this effect is not found with CP complementation, a claim somewhat undercut by her additional claim (p. 75) that adjectives of frequency are actually not possible with singular nouns with (finite) CP complements -a second argument for her hypothesis. In fact, however, the data appear to vary with the choice of nominal. Grimshaw notes the impossibility of such examples as (i)a-b (pp. 75-76, judgments hers):
(i) a. *Their frequent/constant announcement that they were the greatest eventually became tiresome.
b. *His frequent/constant statement that he was about to resign was intended to mislead.
The behavior of other nominals, however, leads us to question the generalization. These other nominals not only allow the construction excluded in (i) (as seen in (ii)), but also show the pattern identified by Grimshaw as characteristic of argument taking in general. The presence of the frequency adjectives in (ii) makes the object CP obligatory, as seen in (iii): (ii) a. His frequent/constant claim that he was about to resign annoyed us. b. The constant belief that someone is trying to poison you is a sure sign of insanity. (iii) a. *His frequent/constant claim annoyed us. b. *The constant belief is a sure sign of insanity.
We suspect that the unacceptability of (i) arises, not from any deficiency in the argument-taking capacity of nominals, but from some interaction between the semantics of specific predicates and the semantics of individual frequency adjectives. For example, in our judgment, the use of repeated instead of frequent or constant in (ib) renders the example entirely acceptable. Crucially, as in (iii), acceptability disappears if the complement is not present. Thus, though there are factors influencing judgments that are not fully clear, it looks as though the complementation properties of N and V are essentially the same, except for the factors under discussion in the main text. For this reason, we have sought an alternative to the family of approaches represented by Stowell (1981) and Grimshaw (1990) . See also Ogawa (2001, 200-216) for fuller discussion along similar lines.
not serve as the subject of a higher clause -just like a finite clause that is not introduced by that.
Exactly the same pattern can be observed in the complement position of nominals. The
English verbs that select infinitival complements can be sorted into those whose complements are irrealis and those whose complements are realis. 23 If we examine the subset of these verbs that have nominalizations, we observe a remarkable correlation. 24 Only a verb that takes an irrealis infinitival complement continues to permit infinitival complementation when it is nominalized. A verb whose infinitival complement is realis, by contrast, excludes infinitival complementation when nominalized. This generalization appears to be quite robust, as (54) and (55) exemplify. 25
23. See footnote 27 for a discussion of ECM and Raising infinitives. 24. We take this correlation from Pesetsky (1989) . 25. We know of only one exception, the noun failure. As noted by Pesetsky (1989) , This noun, like the verb fail, allows an infinitival complement (Bill's failure to leave). Yet fail is a (negative) implicative verb. If Bill failed to leave, then Bill did not leave. We do not have an account of this exception.
-35-(54) Realis infinitival complementation to N: impossible *Mary's hate/hatred to ride in the car *John's dislike to hear rumors about them *Sue's love to solve problems *Harry's bother to check the facts *Bill's luckiness to win a prize *Bill's condescension to speak with us *Mary's dare to defy the government *Mary's disdain to ride in the elevator *Bill's help to understand things *John's management to find a plumber *John's neglect to turn off the light *Sue's omission to mention this *Mary's venture to ring the doorbell *Bill's scorn to answer the letter (55) Irrealis infinitival complementation to N: possible Mary's desire to win Harry's need to be accepted Bill's agreement to ride in the car Bill's arrangement to take the next flight John's wish to win a prize Sue's eagerness to win the prize Sue's attempt to defy the government John's choice to stay late Mary's consent to undergo the operation Bill's decision to ride in the elevator Bill's demand to be taken to the king Mary's endeavor(s) to find a plumber John's hope to understand things Sue's intention to answer the letter John's learning to play the piano Bill's offer to speak with us Sue's plan to leave John's preparation(s) to take the plane Bill's promise to turn off the light Mary's proposal to start the meeting Bill's refusal to ring the doorbell Bill's request to be allowed to leave Sue's resolution to make the call Mary's struggle to get her car to work John's undertaking to pay the bill John's vow to never take the subway Once again, the complementation properties of N contrast with A. Just as adjectives freely accept finite complements with or without that, so adjectives allow either irrealis or realis infinitival complements, in semantically appropriate contexts. This is demonstrated in (53c-d).
In (56), we offer more contrasts between acceptable realis infinitival complements of A and unacceptable realis infinitival complements of N:
(56) Realis infinitival complements: A (possible) vs. N (impossible) a. Mary was happy to learn the election results.
(cf. *Mary's happiness to learn the election results)
b. Tom was depressed to hear that he had been passed over for promotion.
(cf. *Tom's depression to hear that he had been passed over for promotion)
c. John was lucky to pick a topic that no one had worked on.
(cf. *John's luck to pick a topic that. no one had worked on.) 26 d. Sue was very clever to figure this out.
(cf. *Sue's cleverness to figure this out)
e. Bill was rude to behave that way.
(cf. *Bill's rudeness to behave that way)
Clearly, the complementation patterns of N and A are distinct. Thus, it appears unlikely that structures of nominal predication lack T o , like structures of adjectival predication.
Let us therefore start from scratch, and ask what property distinguishes acceptable from unacceptable complements of N. We suggest that the relevant property is the presence of iT on the head of the complement.
Consider first the range of possible complements to N. Consider first PP. A PP, in our approach, is headed by an instance of iT, and thus conforms to the generalization that we are proposing. Consider next finite a CP introduced by that. Such a CP is also an acceptable complement to N. A finite CP introduced by that, like a PP, has an instance of iT in its head (even though the head also contains uT, as discussed above). The same is true of an irrealis infinitival CP -also acceptable as a complement to N. We argued in section 2 that irrealis infinitives are just like finite that-clauses in undergoing movement of T to C (with subsequent morphological merger of T with C). As a consequence, an irrealis infinitive is like a that-clause in hosting an instance of iT in C.
Let us now turn to complements of N that are not acceptable. We begin with finite CPs that are not introduced by that, and their infinitival counterpart -realis infinitives. Such CPs, according to our proposals, do not host an instance of iT in C. The fact that these CPs are not acceptable as complements of N thus conforms to our generalization. The same is true of bare 26. The expression It was John's good luck to pick a topic that no one had worked on does not involve nominal complementation, but extraposition. Contrast *John's good luck to pick a topic that no one had worked on just ran out. This generalization looks very much like a variant of the property attributed to verbal T o in (35). We take this resemblance to be significant. In particular, we will suggest that nominal predication structures are just like their verbal counterparts -and unlike their adjectival counterparts -in containing an occurrence of T o . The T o in nominals, however, differs from the T o in verbal structures in seeking a goal that bears iT, rather than a goal that bears uT. We thus propose an architecture for nominal predication structures like that in (58), which is parallel to the architecture of verbal predication structures presented in (16) and repeated below as (57). The key difference between T oV and T oN is the contrast between (35) (repeated below as (59)) and (60) [continued from previous page] If we were to combine our proposals with the analysis of Chomsky (1981; according to which ECM and Raising infinitives are bare TPs, we would make an entirely wrong prediction about VP and NP. Verbal T o should reject a goal headed by interpretable T, and nominal T o should accept such a goal. This leads us to propose that ECM and Raising infinitives are actually CPs. If we propose that the subject of such CPs raises to Spec,CP much as in finite clauses without that, we immediately understand why such CPs are acceptable as complements of V and A, but not as complements of N. The reason is the same as that provided for the distribution of finite clauses without that:
(ii) a. ... believe [T o , uφ: nondefective] [ CP [Mary, uT] The central difference between such CPs and the others that we have discussed is the fact that uT on the subject (i.e. case on the subject) is not marked for deletion by any element within CP. This means that T is "defective" in the sense already discussed, and also that uT on C is defective in the same sense. The subject moves to Spec,CP as a consequence of agreement with [uT, +EPP] on C, much as it moves first to Spec,TP as a consequence of agreement with [uφ, +EPP] in both our system and Chomsky's. (Defectiveness is no bar to Agreement and EPP-motivated movement, even though the result does not mark features for deletion.) If T moved to C instead of the subject, the subject would not be in a phase-peripheral position, and thus (if Chomsky's Phase Impenetrability Condition is correct) would not be accessible to CP-external probes. When the higher clause contains an unaccusative verb like seem as in (ii)b, the subject in Spec,CP of the embedded infinitive (Mary) ultimately agrees with a higher T s and raises to the higher subject position. When the higher clause contains an active transitive verb like believe in (ii)a, the higher T o marks uT on the embedded subject for deletion, possibly accompanied by movement to Spec, T o , as discussed earlier.
Thus, the fact that ECM and Raising infinitivals have a distribution similar to the distribution of finite clauses without that is directly explained as a consequence of the defectiveness of uT within such infinitivals that motivates ECM and Raising in the first place.
If this analysis is correct, the reference to goal in (59) and (60) should probably be replaced with a reference to goals. Consider an embedded ECM infinitival whose subject is a that-clause. Such examples have occasionally been marked as deviant (e.g. by Stowell 1981) , but seem to be acceptable to most speakers, with appropriately helpful prosody: If our analysis of ECM is correct, the that-clause in (i) occupies Spec,CP of the embedded infinitive. This means that uφ on a higher T o should see the that-clause as a goal. Since the head of a that-clause bears iT as well as uT, this goal should be acceptable not only to verbal, but also to nominal T o . This might make the false prediction that (ii) should be an acceptable nominal:
(ii) *his consideration [[that Mary left] to be a tragedy] Note, however, that not only Spec,CP but (the infinitival) CP itself is a goal of T o , since neither c-commands the other. The fact that the head of infinitival CP bears only uT would exclude (ii) if we required all the goals of nominal T o to bear iT. As far as we can tell, none of our results would be threatened by such an alteration, nor by a comparable view of verbal T o .
-39-
The Nature of Syntactic Categories
The statements in (59) and (60) are "technical" in that they posit a relation between two elements, a probe and its goal, that goes beyond the link between an uninterpretable feature and its interpretable counterpart that is the essence of the Agree relation. If our proposals are on the right track, we must hope that the statements in (59) and (60) will turn out to be consequences of deeper facts about the contrast between nouns and verbs. We speculate that there is a connection between the tense-seeking properties of T o and the tense properties of the category that contains T o . If this speculation is correct, nominal T o seeks a goal whose tense is interpretable (in the languages we have investigated) for reasons connected to the fact that nominal phrases themselves lack the full tense system characteristic of clauses. Our general idea is that there may be an inverse relation between the richness of tense on the predicate and the richness of tense (including prepositions) on its arguments. Recent research on languages in which nominals appear to have a fuller tense system, such as Somali (Lecarme 1997; this volume) and Halkomelem Salish (Wiltschko 2001) suggests that such speculations may be warranted. In this paper, we will not offer a concrete proposal along these lines. Instead, we will explore a different aspect of our proposal: the logic of (59) and (60). We will argue that the logical structure of our system provides a new insight into the nature of syntactic categorizationwhatever the ultimate sources of the generalizations in (59) and (60). 28 Let us review our results so far. In the last two sections, we have developed a proposal about the complementation properties of V, N and A. This proposal, in turn, depended on analyses of the internal structure of CP, DP and PP presented in P&T 2001 and further developed in earlier sections of this paper. We have argued that a VP is a complement of a T (T oV ) with uninterpretable φ-features that seeks a goal that bears uT. NPs differ minimally. An NP is a 28. It is important to ask whether the "technical" property that distinguishes among N, V and A correlates with (or can be explained in terms of) other properties of these categories. Baker (2002) , for example, offers a comprehensive theory of these categories according to which N and V differ in other, more idiosyncratic respects. In particular, only N induces a referential index, and only V (our v) has the ability to take a specifier that bears a thematic role. A is distinguished (in a manner reminiscent of our proposals) by having neither of these properties. Baker's typology of categories is perhaps compatible with the framework sketched here, but we would need to find a link between properties like "bears an index" and occurrences of T that seek iT. The speculations in the main text would presumably be relevant here.
complement of a T (T oN ) with uninterpretable φ-features that seeks a goal that bears iT. An AP is not a complement of any sort of T o .
Our proposal thus postulates correlations between syntactic categories and their complementation properties significantly different from those offered in earlier work. Proposals within the Government-Binding tradition noted the existence of such correlations, but did not assume that the relation between syntactic category and complementation properties was biunique. As we discussed above, much earlier work took the case properties of N and A to be identical (in contrast to V), attributing them to a feature shared by N and A (and not shared by V) -e.g. the [+N] feature of Chomsky (1970) .
What is new in our approach is the identification of structural case with T, and the analysis of certain elements (e.g. that and for) as instances of T moved to C. These ideas provide a new perspective on the formal import of alternations in the C system. Once we view the presence or absence of words like that as an indicator of differences in the distribution of Tense features in a complement CP, differences in the distribution of CP complements to N and A can be seen as part and parcel of the system traditionally called Case Theory.
The picture that emerges is quite different from the traditional one. We have reached a conclusion much stronger than the traditional view. If our suggestions are correct, the relation between the syntactic categories A, V and N and their complementation properties is biunique after all. This biuniqueness is not readily apparent at the level of data, but only becomes clear at a more abstract level. At the level of data, the repertoire of complement types allowed by A, V and N shows considerable overlap, as the chart in (61) We thus see that an apparently chaotic and overlapping pattern of data follows directly from two choices in a decision tree. T o may be present or absent, and it may seek uT or iT. How these choices affect actual complementation patterns is explained by the interaction of these choices with independently motivated analyses of CP, PP and DP.
29. As discussed in section 5 and in footnote 17, it is possible that selected PPs may function as (first) complements of V. If this is the case, we suggested that satisfaction of selectional requirements might outrank the requirement that the goal of verbal T o bear uT. If this is true, then there are instances of PP complements to V admitted by our system, which makes the underlying complementary distribution of complement types even more opaque at the level of data.
The point of special interest now is the fact that each of the categories A, V and N is associated with its own unique syntactic environment. The uniqueness is not evident when we look directly at the complements of these categories, but is evident when we look "upward" to see what if any T o is associated with the category. This raises the possibility that the status of a predicate as adjective, verb or noun is not intrinsic to the predicate. Instead, we might suppose that there is a single category PR (for predicate) whose morphological status as A, N or V is determined by rule, as in (62) Borer (1991 Borer ( /1993 Borer ( , 2001 ) and Fu, Roeper and Borer (2001) , who have argued for the presence of a VP or VP-like constuent in process nominals -where the nominal character of the structure as a whole results from the nominal 30. Our choice of the vague phrase "associated with" in (62) is deliberate, intended to leave open several possibilities. If the structures we have proposed in (57) and (58) are correct, the phrase "associated with" should be taken to refer to the status of PRP as the complement of T oV or T oN . Alternatively, it may be Agree between a feature of T o and features of PR that establishes the relevant association, perhaps combined with head movement of PR to T o (and morphological merger). We must also consider a different possibility, which we have omitted from discussion so far. We have assumed without discussion that the various species of T o are syntactic heads distinct from PR (i.e. independent of V and N) .
It is also conceivable, however, that T o (both verbal and nominal) is not a distinct head at all, but is a set of features of PR. We suggested in footnote 9 that English particles may be overt instantiations of (verbal) T o . We are not, however, aware of constructions that simultaneously contain overt instantiations of T o and PR. It is thus possible that verbs are instances of PR with verbal T o -features; nouns, instances of PR with nominal T o -features; and adjectives, instances of PR devoid of T o -features. The claim advanced in this section would be recast as the claim that the features that distinguish verbs, nouns and adjectives are not sui generis categorial features, but the T ofeatures of PR. The uφ-features that are properties of T o in the proposals discussed in the main text would, on this view, be features of PR. A similar view could be developed for finite T S , which would analyze this T S as a feature of the highest verb of the clause, instead of analyzing it as the first functional projection above PR. Such an analysis is, of course, a mainstay of many viable treatments of the English auxiliary system. We know of no particular reason to choose among these various alternatives. The overall structure of our proposals is independent of this choice.
31. For some critical discussion of these approaches, see Baker (2002, chapter 6 ).
-43-character of the head that embeds the VP. In both streams of research one finds the additional proposal that the functional heads that determine syntactic category are heads that license particular thematic roles. For example, Marantz suggests that the unavailability of a causative external argument in a nominalization like growth -which contrasts with its availability in the corresponding verb -derives from a difference in the argument-taking potential of nominalizing and verbalizing heads. Thus, John grows tomatoes is acceptable because of the existence of a head (v for Marantz) that simultaneously verbalizes and causativizes, while *John's growth of tomatoes (Chomsky 1970 ) is unacceptable because of the non-existence of a head that simultaneously nominalizes and causativizes.
The focus of these proposals differs from ours. We have suggested that the categorial status of a predicate depends, not on an argument-taking head, but on a "case-related" head (T o ) with aspectual properties. It is possible, of course, that these two approaches will turn out to be compatible, as we learn more about the relation between argument-taking and case properties of predicates.
Some subsequent literature has developed other arguments in favor of category-neutral predicates. Although couched in the framework of Marantz (1997) , these arguments can probably be easily recast in our terms. Embick (2000) , for example, in a detailed study of the Latin perfect tense, argues that the status of a predicate as verb or adjective (the category to which he assigns the perfect participle) is determined by the nature of the functional projections that surround it. In particular, a predicate's categorial status is established as a result of calculations that take into account the properties of a voice-related phrase (v for Embick, T o for us) as well as the properties of an aspectual phrase (a higher T in our framework). Pylkkänen (2002) provides another type of argument for the overall proposal. She shows that a CAUSE morpheme in Japanese and other languages may be merged in at least three different points in the syntactic derivation. These distinct sites correlate with distinct semantic properties of the clause as a whole, and also correlate with other syntactic and semantic properties. The point of special relevance to us is her suggestion that the lowest position in which CAUSE may be found lies lower than the head that provides a category-neutral root with its syntactic category. 
[verbal T s / nominal or absent T o ]
32. The integration of this suggestion with the framework of P&T 2001 raises some complex issues discussed in that paper. It is not crucial that nominal T s be the actual source of possessive morphology, but rather that possessive morphology is a sign of the presence of nominal T s . A distinct head, as discussed in P&T 2001, might be responsible for the actual shape of possessive morphology.
In this paper, we have argued that the general theory that explains such facts as the that-trace filter -if extended in natural ways to explain comparable facts about PPs, and about nominal and clausal complementation -leads us to a new view of the very nature of syntactic categories.
This unification of research questions is possible because of the tight links among concepts and phenomena found in the overall framework that we have assumed here. At the very center of this web of connections is the syntax of tense. the read of the books his (strong)
We can begin to make sense of these facts if the weak possessive form entails the presence of a verbal T s much as the use of an object clitic entails the presence of a verbal T o . The use of verbal T s , in turn, entails the presence of verbal T o . This leads us to expect the unacceptability of (iv)b, given the generalization already seen in (64).
